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ABSTRACT
A call for innovation as a means to outpace the acceleration of
technological change and to bolster capabilities quickly is a
central theme of contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy. The need for
innovation is accepted, but the integration of readily available
technologies into the Fleet is slow. Innovation unfolds according
to “Navy-Time,” a cycle lasting between a long-decade and thirty-
years. To accelerate the innovation process in the U.S. Navy, the
article offers a Concept of Operations for Innovation that outlines
how a deliberate process of analysis, weaponisation and
integration can move new ideas and weapons into the Fleet in a
strategically relevant time-frame.
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We are living in an age of acceleration, a time when the pace of innovation is increasing as
the impact of Moore’s law produces unexpected combinations of social, technological and
environmental change at a tempo that often exceeds our ability to adapt.1 This evolving
situation has not escaped the attention of senior U.S. Navy officers. In fact, it is a
primary concern shaping contemporary Naval strategy. According to the former Chief
of Naval Operations John M. Richardson, “The pace of competition has accelerated in
many areas, achieving exponential and disruptive rates of change. As this pace drives
yet more unpredictability, the future is becoming more uncertain … . We cannot
become overwhelmed by the blistering pace.”2 Under these circumstances, it is hard to
chart a response to acceleration – it is impossible for the U.S. Navy to incorporate
every innovation or new technology that comes along, especially because the pace of tech-
nological change is accelerating.
Acceleration also is occurring at a time when the strategic setting facing the Navy is
evolving in dangerous ways. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. naval dominance was
largely uncontested, allowing the Fleet to undertake humanitarian relief operations,
provide air support to ground units, conduct anti-piracy patrols or “forward presence”
missions with minimal risks and threats. Today, the possibility of war at sea looms
large as the People’s Republic of China increases its anti-access and area denial capabilities
across the Western Pacific and the Russians begin to field similar capabilities in the Baltic
and beyond.3 Precision-guided weapons, especially hypersonic kinetic-kill vehicles, auton-
omous weapons systems, and new types of sensors and sensor networks provide sea denial
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capabilities that are difficult to overcome. The U.S. Navy can no longer take command of
the sea for granted in several crucial regions.
Another factor that will shape the evolution of contemporary U.S. Naval strategy is that
Richardson’s tenure as the Chief of Naval Operations is over and there is no guarantee that
his successor will share his appreciation of acceleration. There is no real way of knowing if
the new Chief of Naval Operations will adopt Richardson’s themes as his own by focusing
on the need for innovation and the threat of acceleration when it comes to improving
rapidly the capabilities of the U.S. Navy.4 Incoming Navy chiefs all like to begin their
tenures by issuing new sailing instructions under their own imprimatur and there are
scores of themes that a new CNO could adopt to reassure the Fleet. Nevertheless, accel-
eration will continue to be a dominant trend for the foreseeable future and innovation
remains as an obvious approach to increasing combat capabilities in a relevant time
period, i.e. faster than the competition. The new CNO, for instance, will win his inno-
vation wings if he can position carrier aviation to meet the initial operational capability
date of the MQ-25 Stingray aerial refuelling drone in 2024.5 The new CNO probably
will not be in charge when the U.S. Navy takes its most visible step towards robotics at
sea by deploying the Stingray to refuel piloted carrier aircraft, but it falls on him to
make sure that the United States makes that transition before several competitors who
are also busy pursuing opportunities based on new technologies. Acceleration makes
time the most precious commodity possessed by the incoming CNO; it is important
that he moves out at flank speed to integrate innovations into the Fleet in a relevant
timeframe.
The remainder of this article addresses questions about what is constant and what is
changing when it comes to the strategy, operations and tactics of war at sea. Given the
absence of more obvious alternatives, it suggests several traditional objectives that could
be used to drive the U.S. Navy’s response to this time of rapid technological change
and emerging sea denial threats and how research, analysis and education are becoming
a fundamental enabler of innovation. The article also identifies available advanced tech-
nologies and systems that demonstrate that the U.S. Navy is technically adept, despite
the fact that its timeline for innovation spans absurdly long periods in an accelerated
age. It also identifies initiatives that might increase the pace of innovation in the Fleet.
War at sea: the constants
A gunfight and a ship fight have one thing in common, the side that is first to put rounds
on target usually wins – acceleration has done nothing to negate this fact of naval combat.
Everything about naval tactics, operations, and strategy has to begin with the fundamental
goal of “attacking effectively first;”6 every innovation and technological opportunity has to
be evaluated with this objective in mind. New technologies, such as artificial intelligence,
robotics, nano-energetics or additive manufacturing, become significant when they help
the U.S. Navy put rounds on target first. The guiding principle behind selecting and adapt-
ing innovations remains the same today as it did in the age of sail, despite the fact that the
competition to beat the opponent to the punch has accelerated. The recent rise of Great
Power competition – a consideration that is likely to dominate deliberations in the Pen-
tagon for the foreseeable future – also places strategic importance on combat effectiveness.
Naval officers will become increasingly focused on this axiom of naval warfare – attack
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effectively first – as deterrence of competitors and assurance of allies becomes a focal point
of future U.S. Navy forward presence operations. Combat ineffective ships will not deter or
assure anyone and will not help the Navy obtain the primary objective behind Great Power
competition – to deter the outbreak of Great Power war.
Navy planners sometimes forget another constant as they deal with acceleration: our
innovations do not have to be perfect, they just have to be better than the changes
made by the other guy. Strategy, operations, and tactics are effective in a relative sense.
It is thus probably best to think of innovation as providing an edge in battle and not some-
thing that must produce a sure-fire way to turn every engagement into a lopsided victory.
Similarly, innovations that misdirect an opponent’s fire or allow warships and other
fighting elements to absorb some damage and still attack effectively first, should not be
dismissed out of hand. This is especially true in an age when firepower at sea is likely
to take the form of a single destructive pulse or a series of destructive pulses in the
form of torpedo, missile, or air attacks. Innovations that allow the Navy to misdirect
opponents’ firepower – to waste their opening shot on the wrong target or to miss
altogether – still create that opportunity to attack effectively first. An innovation that pro-
vides a few minutes’ advantage might have the same tactical or operational impact as an
innovation that provides an advantage measured in hours or even days. Small advances
might produce big dividends and should not be ignored in favour of “silver bullets”
that always seem to lie just over the technological horizon. An endless quest to deploy
decisive weapons is a chimera, likely to run afoul of less ambitious innovations that actu-
ally are deployed.
Tactical and operational analysis, an unvarnished appreciation of technology and its
limits and a realistic strategy also remain the sine qua non of war at sea. Pulsed
firepower that strikes you first or weapons that capitalise on Lanchester’s square law of
effectiveness cannot be neutralised on the fly once an engagement begins.7 It is important
to figure things out in advance because tactics and operations that do not exploit Lanche-
ster’s insights, or that fail to land that firepower pulse first, are virtually guaranteed to end
in disaster, despite brave words, crisply pressed uniforms, or years spent at sea. Naval war
is a “come as you are affair,” although acceleration guarantees that the accoutrement of
naval combat is changing at a rapid pace. There is simply not time to consider first prin-
ciples when battle is looming.
Acceleration places a premium on analysis because of the myriad technologies emer-
ging today and their potential applications that create pathways to victory for the side
that exploits them. The struggle to fire the first effective shot is moving further to the
left. Technologies emerging on the horizon might be the key contributor to victory in a
future engagement, provided that they are adopted by the Fleet. New technologies have
to be integrated into operationally, tactically, and logistically co-ordinated systems of
systems to make sure that individual elements do not work at cross purposes. All of
this had to be worked out by officers who have the education and skills needed to identify
and exploit the relative advantages gained through innovation.
Ironically, the notion that the prospects for victory are enhanced when Navy officers
spend more time in a classroom, or conduct research, or explore analytical excursions
and games, or undertake laboratory or field experimentation is not reflected in current
U.S. Navy culture, despite the fact that acceleration has placed a premium on analysis,
the evaluation of technology, and the development of strategy. Senior U.S. Navy
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officials understand that this knowledge deficit exists; the recent Education for Seapower
study led by Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly outlined the need to develop
an officer corps capable of utilising the proliferation of technology that occurs in an age
of acceleration.8 This is not a static objective. Just as the U.S. Navy is making in-roads
in developing its own in-house cyber expertise, for instance, it now faces the challenge
of equipping officers to develop and exploit robotics, artificial intelligence, nano-technol-
ogies, additive manufacturing, etc. The U.S. Navy’s evolving educational and research
enterprise must equip future officers with the knowledge and skill required to assess,
adapt, and integrate technologies into maritime operations before opponents can
exploit those same technologies. Applied research and education are an increasingly
important strategic tool that can shape the “future workforce.”
Implementing the recommendations of Education for Seapower, however, will consti-
tute a major challenge for the new CNO. As the study suggested, the U.S. Navy has
never really had an educational policy; U.S. Navy education is part of the personnel
system. Officer billets are “P-coded” to indicate that officers should possess a particular
educational background, or prior experience before serving in a specific billet. A “quota
model” then determines the number of officers sent to obtain required relevant education.
U.S. Navy personnel managers then monitor educational “utilisation” rates and inven-
tories of qualified officers. This all might sound reasonable enough, but the U.S. Navy
has not gotten around to “P-coding” billets for qualifications in subjects like robotics,
artificial intelligence, nano-technologies, or additive manufacturing, so the quota model
sends no demand signal for these types of curricula. In other words, even if one offered
a curriculum in robotics, officers would not come, despite the fact that nearly everyone
concerned would agree that the U.S. Navy would benefit if officers developed expertise
in emerging autonomous systems and applications. The new CNO must actually break
or jettison the quota model now, for instance, to make sure that the U.S. Navy has edu-
cation programmes and educated officers in place before the Stingray makes an appear-
ance in the Fleet in 2024.
War at sea: the changes
Although the competition inherent in the effort to attack effectively first has always com-
menced before the opening salvo of some engagement, acceleration moves that compe-
tition to the left. The nature of that competition also has changed. The U.S. Navy only
conducts a minimal amount of basic research or technological development – the bulk
of those activities long ago shifted to the private sector.9 Instead, as the previous para-
graphs suggest, U.S. Navy strategists now must monitor and exploit hundreds of commer-
cially produced technologies. Virtually none of these technologies are developed with
naval applications in mind; the burden of assessing, modifying, and exploiting these tech-
nologies falls on officers. In the past, the U.S. Navy had more control over which technol-
ogies were developed because it played a greater role in selecting them and funding them
and even participating in their development.10 Now officers might be presented with a
game-changing technology they never asked for or anticipated. Indeed, this is where the
battle for the first shot begins. Everyone has ready access to new technology, concepts,
and procedures, making intellectual laziness and a reluctance to incorporate change down-
right dangerous. It behooves those who strive to attack effectively first to consider seriously
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how each item in the commercial innovation streammight be tapped to provide an advan-
tage during war at sea.
Officers have to be alert to another potential change produced by acceleration: asym-
metries in capabilities are more likely to emerge abruptly vis-à-vis opposing naval
forces. This might not appear to be a new phenomenon. The broad sweep of naval
history seems to be marked by long periods of stasis punctuated by significant change.
The transition from sail to steam, the development of breech loading cannon with explod-
ing shells, or the emergence of naval aviation, for instance, rendered existing fleets, oper-
ations and tactics obsolete, placing a premium on getting the most out of the new
innovation, or at least getting more out of it than the opponent. Nevertheless, in the
past, seemingly “abrupt” changes actually unfolded over decades. For example, in 1910,
the first Navy officer flew an airplane; the Navy established a Bureau of Aeronautics in
1921. A long-decade later (1934), it possessed four aircraft carriers, including the first
purpose built aircraft carrier, to use for technical, tactical, operational, and doctrinal devel-
opment. Debate about the role of naval aviation ended when the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor in December 1941 clarified matters, but carrier innovation evolved at a leisurely
pace.11 In an age of acceleration, however, innovation that unfolds at a leisurely pace
increases the likelihood that new weapons or systems will actually be obsolete before
they can be fully integrated into the Fleet.
The fact that acceleration produces innovations rapidly is understood by Navy
officers – this is the issue that set CNO Richardson’s pen to paper. What is less under-
stood is that acceleration might produce significant asymmetries in opposing forces
given the highly compressed timelines involved in the emergence of new technologies.
Despite the staggering challenges that had to be overcome to exploit naval aviation,
the U.S. and Japanese navies that fought the Battle of Midway used similar tactics
and fought with similar ships and aircraft despite the fact that none of these systems
even existed thirty years earlier. Combat in the Pacific Theater in World War II was
undertaken by symmetrical forces, despite the fact that the Japanese and U.S. navies
had spent decades integrating innovations into their respective Fleets. We might be
approaching a moment in time, however, when opposing forces might not be “sym-
metrical”: one side might deploy fundamentally different forces based on some inno-
vation that produces a new approach to attacking effectively first. Today, Russian and
Chinese militaries are deploying hypersonic missiles that can penetrate U.S. Navy
missile defences, asymmetric weapons that could conceivably neutralise what are on
balance superior U.S. capabilities.12 In a broader asymmetric departure, China is devel-
oping underwater acoustic systems that might be used to co-ordinate attacks by swarms
of cheap autonomous vehicles.13 The pathways to asymmetric forces are proliferating
and the pace of change is accelerating, which makes it increasingly likely that future
engagements will not necessarily occur between relatively symmetrical forces. All this
makes it imperative that U.S. Navy officers get out in front of the innovation curve.
Put somewhat differently, the principle of “attacking effectively first,” does not
mandate the use of similar platforms or weapons, despite our tendency to envisage
combat as something that occurs between similarly equipped opponents.
Additionally, the potential for asymmetric combat raises the possibility that one side
might become caught on the short end of that asymmetry with ineffective weapons or
tactics. In the interwar period, the “Battleship Admirals,” of the U.S. Navy focused their
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efforts on improving battleship gunnery as a way to compensate for the faster capital ships
of the Imperial Japanese Navy in order to win the titanic clash of opposing battle lines that
was expected to occur somewhere in the Western Pacific. Gunnery improved, but these
efforts came at the expense of developing things like doctrine for independent cruiser
and destroyer flotillas or better appreciation of the potential of carrier aviation. The
Navy paid a heavy cost for these failures. By 1943, many of its battleships, cruisers and
destroyers lay at the bottom of Pearl Harbor and Iron Bottom Sound, the victims of asym-
metric carrier forces, highly-capable “Long Lance” torpedoes and superior Japanese doc-
trine and tactics. By contrast, the much expected clash of opposing battle lines never
occurred, despite American efforts to fight that sort of engagement until the very end of
the war.14
Acceleration also can produce important political and social changes that Navy stra-
tegists should consider; legacy systems, standard operating procedures and organis-
ational cultures might reflect settings that are rapidly fading into the past. A critical
geo-political change of immediate concern is that in the age of acceleration, opponents
are preparing to fight at sea. Ironically, few if any currently serving U.S. Navy officers
have encountered this situation during their careers. As Wayne Hughes and Robert
Girrier note, for decades
U.S. maritime supremacy was so certain that with the rarest of exceptions no enemy had
dared to target American ships at sea. The result has permitted one-sided operations in
which the U.S. Fleet delivered its combat power without any enemy response … .15
This situation is rapidly ending and officers have to come to terms with how strategic and
operational perspectives along with organisational culture and preferences must change to
accommodate the new operating environment.
Another change that should be considered is that government organisations every-
where are finding it difficult to keep up with the pace of change. For instance, it is virtually
impossible to jumpstart government funding cycles. Two or three years might elapse
between the time programmatic course corrections are introduced or new initiatives are
identified and the time monies become available to begin work. Without new monies
and authorities, it is actually illegal to spend resources provided for one purpose on
another, regardless of the importance of that new task. Bureaucracy qua bureaucracy is
also deteriorating as demands for agility and innovation are increasing. As anyone who
currently serves in the government knows, agencies are becoming increasingly sclerotic
as training, compliance and audit requirements proliferate, sometimes pushing the
mission into the background.16 As James Russell notes, the effects of this deterioration
are evident in “an ever-widening chasm between a ponderous ship-development and
acquisition cycle and the pace of change in technologies.”17 Acceleration itself might
not be diminishing organisational capacity, although “innovative” ways to monitor the
workforce or to memorialise routine matters in digital media are drowning out valuable
work. Nevertheless, the demand for rapid innovation highlights how our financial, acqui-
sition, and personnel systems, which each embrace an endless series of training and audit
requirements, are out of step with the pace of change today. Hughes suggests that these
requirements create the antithesis of innovation, a Navy management style that is
afraid to make a mistake. It is “a society that rewards doing nothing perfectly.”18 Put some-
what differently, do nothing and the Inspector General will have nothing to do either.
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Opportunities: low hanging fruit
As one might expect in an age of acceleration, the Navy is surrounded by new technologies
that offer real opportunities to increase the combat capability of the Fleet quickly. Additive
manufacturing, for instance, seems tailor made for Naval applications because it can facili-
tate repairs in at sea, while reducing overall burdens on logistical pipelines. There are
limits to this new technology; it might never be possible to build critical parts made of
exotic materials using additive manufacturing. Nevertheless, there are tens of thousands
of more mundane components that are responsible for making the U.S. Navy a floating
maintenance nightmare. If additive manufacturing can winnow the logistical tail related
to maintenance at sea, or reduce the down time from mundane equipment casualties,
the impact on combat effectiveness could be significant. To get the entire Navy involved
immediately in developing a culture of innovation, it might even be best to charge main-
tenance officers at shore side fleet concentration centres to be the first to use additive man-
ufacturing to improve maintenance and reduce logistical demands. The Navy’s
maintenance issues are so large, and benefits so evident, that it is difficult to explain
why the Navy is not working harder and faster to exploit this new technology. The
Navy possesses additive manufacturing technology, what it lacks is a comprehensive
vision of how it is going to exploit this new technology to attack effectively first.
Another piece of low-hanging fruit is the Sea Hunter, the U.S. Navy’s autonomous
surface ship that is currently undergoing testing in terms of its ability to operate autono-
mously.19 The Sea Hunter, for example, might actually be a good counter to the hypersonic
missile threat emerging on the horizon. In a defence role, the Sea Hunter could simulate
various electronic signatures, misdirecting an opponent’s pulse of firepower against low-
value targets (i.e. itself). In an offensive role, the Sea Hunter could be armed, which
would give the opponent a pressing reason to target the autonomous ships. Admittedly,
the legal, administrative, command, logistical and tactical details of Sea Hunter operations
need to be worked out. The Sea Hunter too is not a production prototype, but an exper-
imental vehicle. Nevertheless, these facts make it absolutely imperative for the Navy to
purchase a couple of dozen of the boats and deliver them promptly to several Destroyer
Squadrons for further experimentation and to begin working on those details. The idea
that a DESRON might actually include more than a few functional combatants, or units
that could be employed deliberately in risky escapades, would create operational and tac-
tical opportunities that have not existed for decades. Real innovation has always occurred
in this manner. The Army Air Corps turned over the task of figuring out how to deliver an
atomic bomb to a Colonel; the Navy really should turn over the task of figuring out how to
fight the Sea Hunter to a couple of Captains. In any event, there are many, strategists, ana-
lysts, and technicians across the Navy who would be eager to help them.
These two examples suggest that the when it comes to working with the latest technol-
ogy, the Navy actually has a good track record and is working with some very promising
systems. Sea Hunter, for instance, holds out the possibility of providing the Navy with a
low-cost way to move some of its firepower out of the dozen or so baskets of carrier avia-
tion where it now resides. The distributed lethality it represents is difficult for the
opponent to target, while the fact that any single platform is expendable opens up new
opportunities for surveillance and deception. The tactical and operational opportunities
created by this new platform, which might become increasingly asymmetrical as future
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generations are miniaturised and armed with nano-energetics, could bring about a new
type of surface warfare. Ironically, the need to distribute lethality to bolster carrier aviation
has been long recognised in Navy circles,20 although the geo-political setting of the
immediate post-Cold War period reduced the urgency behind the effort to find new
ways for U.S. Navy surface forces to attack other surface forces effectively first.
The problem encountered by the Navy, however, is that its process of innovation is
painfully slow and often seems to end up going nowhere even when promising new
systems are at hand. After the prototype checked out in initial testing, for instance, the
Navy placed an order for a second Sea Hunter in 2017.21 Even if the Sea Hunter is
never adopted by the Fleet, one would have expected that at least a dozen of the vessels
would have been purchased to accelerate field testing and the development of operational
concepts that could shape the development of future autonomous surface combatants. In
other words, whilst the U.S. Navy appears interested in the technology related to auton-
omous surface vessels, it seems less interested in exploring the concept of autonomous
surface operations. Technology is available, even maturing systems are on hand, what is
missing is a deliberate process to integrate nascent weapons into the Fleet.
Innovation: from dream to reality
Today the term “innovation” seems to be nestled in utopian visions of a technologically
enabled future that preserves the best things about today, while improving the things
that need improving. Innovation’s focus on technology is irresistible to Americans who
are intoxicated by dreams of a more technologically enabled future.22 In this imagery,
change also occurs without touching anything that is actually valued. Calls for innovation
seem to just reflect enthusiasm for new technologies – a phenomenon captured by the
Gartner Hype Cycle – not some well-crafted plan to weaponise or integrate new technol-
ogy into the Fleet.23 As odd as it may seem, CNO Richardson’s recognition of acceleration
and his associated call for innovation has been welcomed by virtually everyone in the U.S.
Navy without producing deeper thought on the creation of a deliberate methodology to
realise specific innovations or to even identify which innovations might be crucial to
future success. The romantic notion that true innovation is a “bottom-up” affair is so wide-
spread, that the locus of deliberate efforts to integrate specific technologies or systems into
the Fleet are difficult to identify. Even if a group of junior officers identified an opportunity
to launch a Fleet wide innovation, it is not entirely clear who might help them exploit this
insight throughout the U.S. Navy.
Given this “cult of innovation,” several considerations might help move the process of
innovation in the U.S. Navy forward. Officers must first recognise that the service is highly
adept at innovation. Innovation per se is actually common in the U.S. Navy. Throughout
its history, it has undertaken several fundamental changes in the composition and oper-
ations of the Fleet. In hindsight, these transformations – from sail to steam, the introduc-
tion of the “auto-torpedo,” the rise of naval aviation, the introduction of nuclear
propulsion and weapons – often mistakenly appear to be natural and inevitable. In
reality, they were extremely hard fought by those that were championing and managing
these changes. Nevertheless, the most important element of the U.S. Navy’s history of suc-
cessful innovation is that these changes unfolded in accordance with “Navy time,” each
beat lasting between a long decade and thirty years. Thus, the real issue facing the Navy
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is not a reluctance to innovate, but an inability to innovate quickly. If innovation and inte-
gration of new technology proceeds too slowly, it simply turns into an expensive way to
guarantee that the latest maritime systems are nearing obsolescence as they are being
deployed. The Stingray drone will eventually serve as the main tanker for U.S. carrier avia-
tion; now the most pressing challenge is meeting the 2024 target date for placing the drone
into service.24
To address this issue, senior officers have to stop calling for innovation and instead
develop a systematic way to accelerate the introduction of new technology, concepts
and operations into the Fleet. The U.S. Navy lacks a Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
for innovation. New technology does not come packaged for immediate use like a software
update. Someone has to identify how to use the technology to address a problem or to
exploit an opportunity. Someone also has to weaponise that technology and then make
it understood by, and available to, the warfighter. By contrast, there is a tendency to
treat technology as if it were an innovation, something that arrives “out of the box,” so
to speak, relevant and fully capable of helping the Navy attack effectively first. A
CONOPS for innovation, however, would take off the shelf technology and estimate
how it might be employed, how it might be weaponised and how it might be integrated
into the Fleet. At some point, someone also has to develop an assessment of how the
new technology might be integrated into joint operations and joint operational concepts,
questions that will emerge at some point in the journey from laboratory to Fleet inte-
gration as cruel budgetary realities come into play. Without a deliberate CONOPS, prom-
ising technologies can languish. Witness the gap between the potential and the reality of
new technologies – additive manufacturing, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence –
in the U.S. Navy today.
What a new technology might accomplish and how it should be employed has to be
sorted out in advance of an actual engagement. This sort of analysis is not easily achieved
in an age of accelerated change. It is difficult to assess a new technology or innovation
before the next great thing comes along. Situational awareness of the technological state
of the art thus becomes the sine qua non for innovation. This sounds simple enough,
but it is difficult even for experts to anticipate technology trajectories or potential appli-
cations, especially when the interval between major advances is measured in months
and not years. Nevertheless, ignoring the commercial sector today is dangerous because
commerce levels the technological playing field. Friend and foe alike have access to the
commercial innovation pipeline. Given these circumstances, CNO Richardson’s call to
advance the Navy’s partnership with industry is well timed.25
If the starting point for analysis is the identification of a promising technology, the next
step in a CONOPS for innovation would be developing a strategic estimate of the future
operational environment, strategic setting, and emerging joint concepts. Analysts have to
estimate the location, likely course and the stakes involved in a future conflict and how
potential adversaries might be equipped. Technological sophistication alone is no guaran-
tee of battlefield relevance; effective weaponisation is based on accurate estimates of future
contexts and strategic and operational objectives. The Sherman tank, designed to aid
infantry crossing no-man’s land, for example, fared badly when it confronted German
tanks optimised for combat against other armoured vehicles. Although it is easy to attri-
bute this outcome to German technological superiority, the failure of American strategic
analysis explains the decision to bring an infantry support vehicle to a tank fight.26 An
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accurate assessment of the context of future conflict helps strategists identify the types of
capabilities that would allow the Fleet to attack effectively first.
Operational and tactical analysis and experimentation mark the transition from analy-
sis to weaponisation because they focus on turning some technological opportunity into an
actual weapon or a system that can contribute to the combat effectiveness of a ship or a
fleet. Designers can determine the form a weapon will take, where it will be deployed
and how it might interact with other systems and weapons. The key question for analysts
is to develop relevant measures of effectiveness by identifying the types of problems
addressed by a potential system. Operators can then determine how best to employ the
weapon to produce its maximum effectiveness and then model various exchanges and
scenarios to explore potential combat outcomes. Indeed, one of the potential innovations
available to the U.S. Navy is in the realm of modelling and simulation – increases in com-
putational power, artificial intelligence, and data analytics can be combined to explore
hundreds of variables in millions of potential scenarios. These excursions also would
help validate estimates of potential effectiveness, especially the ability to play expected
roles in likely scenarios.
Operators also play a crucial role in the weaponisation process by validating, if not
devising, basic operational and tactical procedures associated with a new weapon.
Those young people that populate the romantic imagery of technological utopias actually
have a role to play by bringing their operational currency to bear in figuring out how to
best fight new systems and weapons. The capabilities of the Sea Hunter, for instance, are
fairly well understood and its operational characteristics can be modelled with much cer-
tainty. Nevertheless, exactly how some DESRON commander will employ this new capa-
bility is a matter of conjecture. Will Sea Hunter sail under its own power from port, or will
it be transported and then deployed close to its area of operations? Will it be used as a
decoy, or an ISR platform, or will it be armed and used as a strike platform? Will it
cruise in a tight or a loose formation with other vessels in the DESRON? Much in the
same way that Colonel Paul Tibbets and the other members of the 509th Composite Bom-
bardment Group worked out how to use a B-29 to drop an atomic bomb, a DESRON com-
mander and his or her staff should be tasked with devising ways to employ optimally the
Sea Hunter. Regardless of the specific system or technology under consideration, sooner or
later experimental, or prototype equipment, has to be delivered to operators so that they
can begin to develop and test concepts in the unforgiving maritime environment.
Weapons can only reach their full potential when they are supported by logistical, per-
sonnel, and doctrinal elements that allow them and the entire force to attack effectively
first. If logistical or maintenance requirements are too taxing; however, weapons might
not be able to be employed to their full effect, or other elements of the Fleet might
suffer shortages as resources are consumed by one system. One of the themes emphasised
by former CNO Richardson is the need to guarantee the sustainability of the Fleet27 –
logistical requirements cannot be treated as an afterthought in an effective innovation
CONOPS. Similarly, personnel requirements loom large when it comes to fielding new
weapons because U.S. Navy officers, certeris paribus, are unlikely to be familiar with the
principles, concepts, and operational and tactical practices that are embedded in truly
innovative systems. Relying on a 25-year career path to cultivate new skills and knowledge
inside the Navy is preordained to failure when the CNO is calling for the deployment of
the Stingray MQ-25 aerial refuelling drone “as soon as possible.”28 Developing and
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disseminating operational and tactical doctrine also is important across the entire U.S.
Navy so that sailors everywhere understand how their specific mission and tasks interact
with the new weapon or system. For innovation to take hold, the entire Navy has to
change, albeit in ways that some might find disconcerting, or personally and professionally
threatening. Indeed, one element of innovation that is rarely if ever mentioned by anyone
is devising ways for the Navy to go about jettisoning processes, organisations and person-
nel rendered obsolete by innovation.
Without a CONOPS for innovation, only serendipity would bring about the confluence
of analysis, weaponisation, and integration that would produce an effective weapon or
process quickly. Alternatively, innovation could be pursued through a lengthy process
of trial and error, which would be costly in terms of a high premium resource (i.e.
time) in an age of acceleration. This is essentially what is occurring today as the U.S.
Navy slowly develops and deploys the infrastructure, personnel, and equipment needed
to support autonomous ships and aircraft, a process that unfolds according to Navy
time. Rapid innovation might not be so elusive, however, if the Navy possessed a deliberate
CONOPS to bring it about.
Conclusion
Without fundamental change in the U.S. Navy, without a CONOPS to accelerate the selec-
tion, weaponisation and integration of new technology into the force, innovation in the
Fleet will not outpace developments in an accelerated world. Indeed, the dilemma
facing the Navy is that it must somehow separate the innovation process from its procure-
ment, personnel, and maintenance cycles that last between a long decade and thirty years –
the standard measure of Navy Time. This creates a dilemma for innovation proponents
who themselves seem to ignore the fact that the Navy itself must change before it can
keep pace in an age of acceleration. To innovate quickly, the Navy must change, but
this flies in the face of imagery that depicts technology as something that enhances the
way things are in a manner that does not upset the apple cart.
It also is impossible to avoid the observation that while officers are quite happy to adopt
new technology, they are reluctant to see the U.S. Navy change as an institution.29 This
situation is not based in a lack of technological awareness or sophistication or in an
irrational embrace of tradition, but in the reluctance of individuals and organisations to
part with beloved weapons, practices, and institutions that create personal identities,
purpose, and status.30 This is not just another rant against hidebound bureaucrats, but
acknowledgement of the fact that the problem we face is not the absence of new ideas,
it is our inability to abandon old ones. True innovation changes the way things are and
threatens the established order; it is why academic disciplines – political science for
example – advance one dead political scientist at a time.31 It is really no surprise, for
instance, that pilots and flight officers from the U.S. Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye (airborne
radar and air traffic control) community, not fighter pilots who currently carry out the
tanker mission, will be placed in charge of the Stingray once it is deployed on carriers.32
In other words, fighter pilots have chosen not to become directly involved with the Stin-
gray in an effort to keep drones at a safe distance from the cherished combat mission.
Innovation is one thing, but changing the U.S. Navy is a course of action that can be
difficult to contemplate as the basis of naval strategy.33
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